

Message Text

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ACTION EA-09

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R 130827Z SEP 76
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9410

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SEOUL 7258

FOR EA ONLY; ATTENTION: AMBASSADOR SNEIDER

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, KS, KN, US
SUBJECT: CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES

SUMMARY. RECENT JSA INCIDENT POINTS UP NEED FOR JOINT
POLITICAL/MILITARY REVIEW OF PROCEDURES IN SEVERAL AREAS.
EMBASSY RECOMMENDS JOINT STATE/DEFENSE INSTRUCTION CALL-
ING FOR EMBASSY/UNC REVIEW OF PROCEDURES. END SUMMARY.

1. AUGUST 18 JSA INCIDENT AND OUR ACTIONS IN ITS AFTERMATH
HAVE ALERTED US ANEW TO FACT NORTH KOREANS CAN GET AT US
DIRECTLY IF THEY CHOOSE AND TO CONSEQUENT NEED FOR BEST
POSSIBLE PROCEDURES IN EVENT OF SUCH CONTINGENCIES.
EXPERIENCE HAS ALSO POINTED UP SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES IN
US AND ROK ATTITUDES IN APPROACHING SUCH INCIDENTS.

2. SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS TOWARD BETTER SECURITY AND
MINIMIZING RISK OF INCIDENTS HAS BEEN MADE IN REACHING
AGREEMENT TO DIVIDE JSA. MOREOVER, IN LIGHT PUBLIC
RELATIONS BEATING NK HAS TAKEN OVER AUGUST 18 AFFAIR,
THEIR EVIDENT DESIRE AND EFFORTS TO GET CURRENT ISSUE
BEHIND THEM, AND THEIR WORLDWIDE DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN,
WE ARE INCLINED TO THINK NORTH KOREANS WILL BE MORE
CAREFUL ABOUT PROVOCATIONS, AT LEAST IN NEAR FUTURE.
AT SAME TIME WE SEE NO EVIDENCE OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE
IN NORTH'S ATTITUDES AND APPROACH; FUTURE INCIDENTS ON
THE DMZ WOULD SEEM TO BE VERY LIKELY; AND INCIDENTS
INVOLVING US IN JSA ARE SUFFICIENTLY POSSIBLE TO

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WARRANT STUDY OF AUGUST 18 INCIDENT WITH VIEW TO

IMPROVING PROCEDURES.

3. CAREFUL REVIEW OF FACTS SURROUNDING INCIDENT IS UNDERWAY AT UNC AND EMBASSY DOES NOT WISH TO PREJUDGE THIS INVESTIGATION. FACTS WE ALREADY KNOW CLEARLY SUGGEST AREAS FOR PROCEDURAL REVIEW, HOWEVER. THUS THIS MESSAGE, WITHOUT ATTEMPTING AT THIS STAGE TO ANSWER THEM, SETS OUT CERTAIN ISSUES THAT MUST BE ADDRESSED:

A. LESSON NUMBER ONE FROM RECENT INCIDENT IS HARDLY A NEW ONE: PROBLEMS AT JSA, INDEED ALONG FULL LENGTH OF DMZ, RELATE TO OUR OVERALL POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND ARE FUNDAMENTALLY POLITICAL IN NATURE. INDEED, BEST SPECULATION INDICATED THAT NORTH SEEKS INCIDENTS TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL, NOT MILITARY, OBJECTIVES. WE ARE TRYING TO PREVENT MILITARY CONFRONTATION WHILE MAINTAINING ROK SECURITY. THUS, OUR INTERESTS REQUIRE CONSIDERATION OF POLITICAL ASPECTS AT ALL MILITARY LEVELS AND CAREFUL POLITICO/MILITARY COORDINATION TO PREVENT ESCALATION WHILE STILL ACHIEVING DESIRED OBJECTIVES. BASIC QUESTION FOLLOWS: HOW MUCH POLITICAL (DIPLOMATIC) CONTROL IS NECESSARY--OR PUT ANOTHER WAY, WHERE AND HOW SHOULD POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS BE INFUSED AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF MILITARY COMMAND AND STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PROBLEM? THE JSA IS NOT BERLIN AND WE DO NOT AT THIS TIME BELIEVE THAT EXTENSIVE STATE DEPARTMENT CONTROL AS EXISTS IN BERLIN WOULD BE NECESSARY OR APPROPRIATE. OUR EXPERIENCE WITH AUGUST 18 AFFAIR NONETHELESS INDICATES NEED FOR CLEAR-CUT JOINT EMBASSY/UNC PROCEDURES TO INSURE EARLIER AND LESS AMBIGUOUS OVERALL POLITICAL (DIPLOMATIC) CONTROL IN EVENT OF EMERGENCY.

B. CRITICALITY OF JSA, POTENTIAL RAPIDITY OF FLARE-UPS, AND THEIR POTENTIAL FOR ESCALATION CALL FOR MAXIMUM FEASIBLE ADVANCE PREPARATION ON THE PART OF POLITICAL (DIPLOMATIC) AS WELL AS MILITARY AUTHORITIES. AGAIN THE JSA IS NOT BERLIN AND SUCH EXTENSIVE CONTINGENCY PLANNING AS UNDERTAKEN IN BERLIN CASE WOULD NOT BE COST/EFFECTIVE. HOWEVER, THOROUGH POLITICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY REVIEW OF JSA RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND

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STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES IS CALLED FOR. FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION TO POSE IS WHETHER HIGHLY CONSTRAINED POSTURE ON JSA GUARDS NOW IS MOST APPROPRIATE WAY TO DETER CONSTANT NORTH KOREAN PROVOCATION; MANY OF OUR OWN PEOPLE AS WELL AS ROKS CONCLUDE NORTH ONLY RESPECTS FORCE AND BELIEVE THAT TOUGHER, "EYE FOR AN EYE" POSTURE, WHILE CONTRIBUTING TO TENSIONS IN SOME WAYS, WOULD PROVIDE BETTER LONG RUN DETERRENT.

C. QUESTIONS ALSO NEED TO BE ASKED ABOUT PROCEDURES FOR MONITORING AND IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL PROBLEMS BEFORE THEY OCCUR. AUGUST 18 INCIDENT WAS PRECEDED BY SEVERAL EVENTS, SUCH AS INTENSIFIED PROPAGANDA BY NORTH AND CONTINUED HARRASSMENT IN JSA LIKE THAT WHICH MET AUGUST 6 TREE-CUTTING ATTEMPT, WHICH IF BROUGHT TO HIGHER LEVEL POLITICAL AND MILITARY ATTENTION MAY HAVE INDICATED SUFFICIENT PATTERN TO ALERT US AHEAD OF TIME TO NEED FOR CHANGE IN STANDARD OPERATIONS. WE CONCLUDE THAT IMPROVED EARLY WARNING MECHANISMS INCLUDING FULL POLITICO/MILITARY CONSULTATIONS ON ALL INDICATORS AND INCIDENTS ARE CALLED FOR.

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FOR EA ONLY; ATTENTION: AMBASSADOR SNEIDER

D. GIVEN NK PENCHANT FOR PROVOCATION AND THEIR SKILL AT IT, EVEN WITH NEW JSA ARRANGEMENTS, WITH BEST POSSIBLE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND WITH IMPROVED ADVANCED WARNING SYSTEM, WE MUST ASSUME POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE JSA CONFRONTATIONS EXPANDING INTO MAJOR INCIDENT. THEREFORE PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING VARIOUS CONTINGENCIES, PARTICULARLY THOSE NOW MORE LIKELY TO OCCUR AS RESULT NEW ARRANGEMENTS, I.E. KIDNAPPING ACROSS MDL, DEFECTIONS, ENTRANCE OF KPA SECURITY PERSONNEL IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES INTO OUR AREA, PHYSICAL CONTACTS, ETC., ALL MUST BE RECONSIDERED FROM POLITICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY POINT OF VIEW. RELATED RULES GOVERNING NOTIFICATION TO HIGHER AUTHORITY, SEOUL DIRECTED CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND LINES OF AUTHORITY ALSO NEED BETTER DEFINITION.

E. IN VIEW NEED FOR WASHINGTON LEVEL DECISION MAKING IN EVENT ANOTHER JSA AFFAIR GETS SERIOUS ENOUGH, WE BELIEVE LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND AUTHORITY FROM WASHINGTON ALSO REQUIRE BETTER DEFINITION. SOLVING MOST RECENT PROBLEM WAS COMPLICATED BY FACT THERE WERE TWO COMPETING REPORTING AND INSTRUCTION CHANNELS BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND SEOUL. WHILE THERE MUST BE MECHANISM FOR DISCUSSING OPTIONS AND AIRING VIEWS, WE SEEK NEED FOR SINGLE PREDESIGNATED COMMUNICATION CHANNEL FOR INSTRUCTIONS AND CLEAR-CUT MANDATE TO AMBASSADOR TO CARRY THEM OUT.

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5. APART FROM ABOVE, ONE OTHER RELATED AREA FOR REVIEW IS PROMPTED BY I CORPS COMMANDER'S REMARKS DURING VISIT CLEVELAND AND WILLNER JUST MADE TO HIS HEADQUARTERS. WITHOUT GOING INTO ALL OF HIS REASONS, LT. GENERAL CUSHMAN IS CONVINCED AS RESULT HIS OWN REVIEW AUGUST 18 AFFAIR THAT WE MUST HAVE SUFFICIENT AMERICAN TROOPS CLOSE AT HAND OUTSIDE JSA, BUT NORTH OF IMJIN RIVER, TO ARTICULATE CONTROLLED RESPONSE TO FAST-MOVING EVENTS IN JSA; FOR EXAMPLE HE SAYS WE COULD NOT HAVE CARRIED OUT TREE-CUTTING EXERCISE SO EFFECTIVELY WITHOUT RELIANCE ON AMERICAN FORCES. ACCORDINGLY, WE BELIEVE PLANS TO REMOVE AMERICAN COMPANY FROM DMZ AREA CLOSE TO JSA SHOULD BE CAREFULLY REVIEWED WITH THIS REQUIREMENT IN MIND. TO MAINTAIN PROPER POLITICO/MILITARY CONTROL WE MUST HAVE APPROPRIATE US RESOURCES AVAILABLE.

6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION: WE PLAN TO PROCEED WITH OWN REVIEW OF LESSONS LEARNED FROM THIS INCIDENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF MORE CONCRETE RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING PROCEDURES IN AREAS OUTLINED ABOVE. WE PLAN TO HAVE THEM AVAILABLE UPON YOUR RETURN. THIS IS OBVIOUSLY SENSITIVE AREA FOR OUR MILITARY COLLEAGUES, HOWEVER, SINCE WE WILL BE REVIEWING WHAT THEY HAVE TO LARGE EXTENT HITHERTO CONSIDERED THEIR OWN PRESERVE AND WILL BE RECOMMENDING OUR OWN MORE EXTENSIVE INVOLVEMENT IN THEIR COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES. WE CONCLUDE THAT BEST WAY TO INSURE DEVELOPMENT AND EVENTUAL ACCEPTANCE OF PROPER POLITICO/MILITARY PROCEDURES IS FOR ISSUANCE JOINT STATE/DEFENSE INSTRUCTION CALLING FOR EMBASSY/UNC REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON ISSUES RAISED ABOVE AND ANY OTHER WASHINGTON MAY HAVE IN MIND. ACCORDINGLY, WE URGE THAT SUCH AN INSTRUCTION BE ISSUED ASAP.

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